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Draft Recommendation
on European naval cooperation 
- 
Frigate programmes
The Assembly,
(t) Consrderrng the increasing rmportance of naval armed forces in European security and defence,
(ir) Recalling rn this connection WEU's contribution to the Gulf u'ar and the embargo tn former
Yugoslavra;
(iu) Bearing in mind further that the Falklands u,ar revealed navtes' ri'idespread vrlncrabrlrty' to
missile attack. Ieading to new types of frigate desrgn u'ith enhanccd anti-missile and antt-atr rvarfare
capabrlitl';
(tr) Recalhng the NFR90 prolect, u'hereby various NATO countrtes tned to reach agreement on a
corrrmon frigate destgn,
(r) Considenng that European naval development can bc achteved cooperatively, rnside NATO, but
takrng European defcnce industry interests lnto account.
(r,) Welcoming thc various fngate prograrnmes currcntll' under u'av rn Europe. namcly TFC
(Trilateral Frrgate Cooperation) betu'een Germanv, Spain and the Netherlands. and thc Horizon
programme, rnvolvrng France, Itah'and the United Krngdom,
(w) Takrng the vieu'that cooperatron must not be reduced solely' to technrcal and industrral fields but
should extend to tactrcal and operatronal areas;
(wr) Recalhng rn thrs connectron the Britrsh Govcrnment's dectston to make tts opcrattonal sea-
trainmg facrlrtres available to WEU for national or collective use b1'WEU countnes, as thc Btrmingham
Declaration confirmed;
(tx) Notrng furthermore that the defirutron of a common concept as the basrs for genume cooperatlon
of necessrtv requrres tdentrcal scheduhng.
(x) Stressrng the importance attached to promotmg a culture of cooperatron rvrthtn firms, preferabll'
through rnvolvement rn programrnes that are strarghtfonvard;
(n) Considerrng finall1, that openrng up Euromarfor to other countrtes u'rshtng to lorn u'ould
constrtute a ven'posrtrve development for that organrsatlon. ln vlc\\'of the fact that rts ratson d'Atre s
bound up u'rth the conduct of Petersberg tasks.
RECOMN{ENDS TFIAT TT{E COUNCIL
l. Set up a Naval Group along the same lmes as the Space Group. the ob.;cctrves of u'hrch mrght be,
mter aha.
- 
to study' the future naval requrremcnts of WEU member countrtes, takrng account of
Petersberg tasks Such a studl' should cover frigates, corvcttes, logrstrc support vessels,
submannes, torpedoes, including weapons systems, naval patrol aircraft, marlne helicopters
and embarked reconnaissance UFVs;
- 
to brrng schedules rnto line.
- 
to encourage naval cooperatron at technical and industrral levels,
to develop the Organisation's operatronal role through the use of exrstrng trarning facrlities,
to encourage Euromarfor to open up to other countrres.
- 
to promote naval trarnrng exerclscs conducted specifically u'ith Petersberg tasks tn vle\\'
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I. Introduction
l. The term "frigate" was reintroduced into
naval parlance by the Britrsh Ro1'al Nary dunng
the second u'orld u'ar to denote a mass-produced,
Iong-range antr-submarine escort shrpr More
recentlv, in the 1960s and 70s, frigates acqurred
by most fightrng navies around the rvorld offered
capabilities that could be described as generahst,
rvithout particular specialisation in a given com-
bat area, or, m other rvords with limrted capa-
bilities in any, area of combat.
2 The Falklands rvar in the early 1980s
meant that the rulnerabilrty of these types of
ships and of navies in general to Exocet mrssiles
and, bv extenslon, to any antr-shrp weapon, was
lard bare 
- 
rvhrch led to a rethink about a new
tyoe of frrgate
3. Thus the definitron of thc neu' concept for
the frigate marked a return to the classic defini-
tion as the ''smallest warshrp capable of rnde-
pendent deplorment" and that m turn imphed
effectrve anti-mis sile and anti-aircraft capabrlrtres
as rvell as a reasonable anti-submanne defence
capabrlrty
4. Thrs gave rrse to the NFR90 0'IATO
Frigate Replacement for the 90s) prolect uhrch,
although it succeeded rn drawmg the malority of
NATO countnes, nevertheless failcd to get off
the ground. as it proved impossrble for such a
large group of countries to reach agreement u,hen
rt came to definrng a conxnon concept
5 Hou'ever thrs rnrtral abortrve attempt nev-
ertheless sou,ed the seed from rvhrch Europe's
trvo current programmes sprang. These are Tri-
latcral Fngate Cooperation (TFC), a partnershrp
betlveen Germany, Sparn and the Netherlands,
and Honzon, whrch brings together France. Italy'
and the United Kingdom
6. These programmes, as wrll subsequently
become apparent, are far from srmilar as regards
the degree of cooperation involved between gov-
ernments and industry, the technical specifi-
cations of the vessels, their weapons and radar
systems and so on, and it is precisely that drver-
' Nouoryorrrs.2lg'7 .
srty u,hich, rn the Rapporteurs' opinion, makes
their study and thc reasons that led to the choice
of a particular option the more intcresting.
II. Cooperation between Germony, Spain
and the Netherlands
7 As has already been said, the NATO Frig-
ate Replacement for the 90s (NFR90) ultimately
came to grief in the late 1980s because it was
impossible for the particrpant countnes to reach
agreement on the definrtion of a common con-
cept. The same thing happened u'rth the NATO
Antr-Air Warfare S1'stem (NAAWS) pro-
granune, the purpose of which rvas to develop a
local area missile s),stem ln con;unctron with the
NFR90
8. The demise of thesc programmes did not
do au'ay rvith the need various countnes $'ere
expressmg to procure frrgates *rth arr-defence
capabrlrty. Germany and the Netherlands, joined
later by Spain, therefore agreed on a ncw pro-
grarnme known as Tnlateral Frigate Cooperatron
or TFC.
9. It u,as agreed rrght from the start of the
cooperation prograrnme that rts purpose n,as not
joint constructron of vessels but obtaining the
most cost-effective outcome rn terms both of pro-
curement and life-cy'cle cost. Thrs left countries
free to choose their oim preferred solutrons.
This three-u,a)' cooperatron rs in fact confined to
thc shrp's platform and does not extend to svs-
tems mstalled thcrc
10. Cooperation therefore takes place rn arcas
where it is possrble and feasrble, whrch meant
that Spain rvas able to loin the programme.
although it is not involved rn developing the Antr-
Air Warfarc System rvhere cooperation is res-
tricted to Germany and the Netherlands
I l. The cooperation agreement envrsages each
country building rts orm fngates to rndependent
but largely' homogenous design. Jornt procure-
ment has been agreed ln some areas to secure the
best prices and development costs are shared.
12 In January 1994 a memorandum of un-
derstandrng (MOU) on the definition phase rvas
srgned by the thrce countries Thrs phase rvas
,182 Ll \l/
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undertaken rndependentlv b1, gn.h ofthe partners
although meetrngs iverc held at regular intervals
dunng rvhich attempts n,ere made to hammer out
solutrons ln corrrmon, ;ornt specrfications \\'ere
produced. informatron exchanged and arcas of
cooperatlon idcntified
13 The TFC conccpt is therefore a project
rvhere each country' burlds similar shrps with
national variants, on the basis of partial coop-
eratron and takrng advantage of svnergres pro-
duced through shared engineering experience,
lornt definition and procurement of equipment
and specific collaboration over combat systems
14. The agreements reached on the defirutron
phase have resultcd m firm cooperatlon betu'een
the three governments on the basis of an MOU
signed behl'een therr respectrve na','ies and mdus-
tnal collaboration through agreements srgncd in
September 1994 betu'een ARGE (Germanr,),
Bazan (Spain) and Roy'al Schelde (Netherlands)
u'rth a vrerv to 
.;ornt definrtion of equipment, co-
operation over detarled platform studies and the
framing of a lornt stratcgr- for shipy'ards for con-
structron of the combat s1'stem
15 We shall nou turn to discussion of thc
particular charactcrrstics of each of the frrgates.
for u'hrch Germanl'has alreadv srgned a contract
for thrce, u'ith an optron on a fourth, ri'hrlc Spain
and the Nethcrlands arc to burld four vessels
aplecc.
Germant,'s Ii- I 2 I 
.fn gat e
I6 Follorvrng cancellatron of the NFR90 pro-
gramme. rn 1990 Germanv and the Netherlands
srgned a Memorandum of Understandrng on
Naval Shrp Cooperatron (MOU NSC) u'hich lard
dorvn thc basrs for cooperatron betueen the tu'o
countnes rn the field of "naval research, devel-
opment, procurement and hfe-cy'cle support,
u'herever the Natrons rdentrfi' a benefit from co-
operatlon".
l7 Fngate requrrcments, schcdules and costs
\\'ere revre\\'ed ol'er a trvo-r'ear penod to ascer-
tam u'hether cooperation could be bcneficral
Durmg that trme the definrtron changed from that
of a multr-purpose frigate r.rrth special antr-sub-
manne u'arfare capabilitres to that of a frigate
uhose prlmar)' role u'as anti-arr rvarfare covcr
for task force protcction.
18. In this tuo-)'ear long process (1992-93).
Germanv and the Netherlands identrfied a com-
mon need for fngates, harmonrsed thcrr frrgate
rcqurrcments, defincd a lornt approach to the
weapons and sensor surte, agreed a common
supcrstructural la1'out for the frrgates. grvrng rise
to an almost identical design study', and an
approach to the combat directron svstem (CDS)
u'hrch madc joint softu,arc production possrble 
-
rcsulting in effective cost-sharing rvrth conse-
quent reductions in each natron's costs and har-
monised and stnchronrsed schedules for frigate
production.
19. In 1994, as stated prevrouslv, Germany,
Spain and thc Nethcrlands signed an MOU on
common definrtron of therr frigates According to
the Gcrman authontres thc underlying pnncrple
u'as to identrfl'. during project definition, poten-
tial areas ofcooperatron hkell'to grve rrse to dev-
elopment u'ork, drax, up a Jolnt procurement list
of as many items as possrble and agree a pro-
curcment programme for the three natrons and,
u,here approprrate. shares ln an), development
u'ork necessary,.
20 Thc approach here consrsted rn agreeing
cornmon solutions as far as possible rn terms of
shrp desrgn, standards and rules and regulatrons,
both rn order to achreve real cost savings and
avord rmposing overlv specific solutrons, u'orking
methods or other constrarnts In thrs u'a1, rt rvas
possrblc to put in place a highll' cost-effectrve
natronal construction proccss rncorporatrng the
maximum number of common elements
21 Germanl' formed a companv to burld the
ARGE F-124 frrgatc consrstmg of Blohm und
Voss GmbH, as thc leadrng 1'ard, Hox'aldtrverkc-
Deutsche Werft AG and Thy'ssen Nordseex'erke
GmbH
22 The outcome of the definitron phase
(1994-95) \\'as as follous natronal procuremcnt
preparation rn all threc countrles..;ornt spec-
ifications for rtems in common. thus allou'rng the
vanous govemment organisatrons to set to u'ork
burlding frrgates equrppcd rn the same \\,ay, 1n
thc casc of Germanl' and the Netherlands
rdentical weapons. sensors, CDS and platform
componcnts, methods and technical standards, a
corrmon tendering process for identrcal ttcms.
loint development bi' Germanl' and the Nether-
lands of some components for the multi-function
radar sy,stem (APAR or Actrve Phased Arral'
Radar) and related fire-control softu,are and for
the AAW (Antr-Arr Warfare) system rncludtng
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intcgratron of thc SM-2 missrle , development of
the ESSM (Evolved Sea Sparrou, Missile) ri'ith
ten other NATO natrons and further informatron
and status exchanges betu'een firms and got'ern-
ments.
23. The procurcment process started in June
1995 with thc signing of the contract for con-
struction of the Dutch frigate, follou'ed rn March
1996 b1' Germany's F-124 frigate and the Span-
rsh F-100 in Februarl' 1997 AII procuremcnt
contracts secured parliamentary approval.
24. The MOU for the developmcnt of the
APAR multi-functron radar rvas signcd by Ger-
ffilmy, the Nethcrlands and Canada rn 1995 and
rn 1996 the same three countries also signed thc
MOU for the AAWS u,rth rntegratron of thc SM-
2 mrssrle Lasth'. 1996 also sau'the srgnature of
the trilateral MOU betu'een Germanr,, Sparn and
the Netherlands for the DD&C (design, devclop-
ment and construction) phase
25 The F-124 has a CDS (combat direction
sl,stem) that uses a real-trme database and rnte-
grated communrcatlons network u,ith 17 multr-
functronal consoles and processors, 2 largc-
screen tactrcal displal's. l2 bus rnterface units, a
Cosmos monrtor, a redundant databus and drs-
tributed processing
26 The F-124's antr-air u'arfare sl,stem con-
srsts of APAR 
- 
a multi-functlon, statrc-facc
radar u'rth the latest rn mmiaturrsed. integrated
transmiVrecerve modules, medrum and long-
range SM (Standard Mrssrle)-2 Block IIIA antr-
arr mrssrles and, for the future. Raltheon and
Hughes's ESSM although u'rth a drfferent gurd-
ance sl,stem to that used b.v the Unrted States
The mrssrles u'rll be fired from a VLS MK-41
32-cell launcher The F-124 u'rll also comc
equrpped u'rth tu'o Rolhng Airframc Mrssile
(RAM) launchers and two quadruple Harpoon
missrle launchers and rvill carn' a tradrtronal
Smart-L long-range radar.
27. Thc degree of cooperatlon over the arr-
defence svstcm the countrics involved in the trr-
lateral programme maintarn u'rth the Unrtcd
Statcs is strikrng. Apart from Sparn's chorce of
the Aegis system, to be drscussed in a later sec-
tron of this report, other examplcs of such coop-
eratlon are the ESSM (Raltheon-Hughes), the
MK-41 VLS, the SM-2 and relatcd software, the
SM-2 algorithms and software packages, all of
uhrch rnvolve the threc partner countrres and the
United States, and thc RAM (Rolling Arrframe
Mrssrle) rnvolving the latter and Germany
28. Thc F-124 ri'ill also have tu'o triple MK-
32 torpedo launchcrs and helicopter-borne long-
range light-rveight torpedoes. Addrtionallv it
comes equipped u'ith an Oto Melara 76 mm gun
and trvo Rheinmetal 20 mm guns.
29. The flight-deck and hangar accommodate
tu'o on-board NH-90 hehcopters. The tu'o han-
gars are separated b1'a passagerval,for fire pro-
tection The hehcoptcrs are supported bv a fulIy'-
equipped and stocked marntenance workshop, a
briefing room and hehcoptcr handling equrpment
30 The Helicopter Handling Sl,stem from
MBB-Forder und Hebesysteme uses laser-gurded
and computer-controllcd manrpulator arms to
secure thc hehcopter aftcr landrng The svstem,
handled by a single operator from a portable re-
mote control handset, allows the hehcopter to be
transferred to a hangar u'rthout manual lnten'cn-
tron The hehcopter flrght-deck is rated to ac-
commodate a 15-ton class hehcopter, such as a
Merhn, for fuelling and torpedo loading
31. Thc F-124 uses a CODAG (combrned
dresel and gas) propulsion s1,stem. In diescl
mode, the ship has an operating range of 4 000
nautrcal mrles at a cruismg speed of l8 knots In
combrncd dresel and gas propulsion modc thc
shrp can reach a maxlmum spccd of 29 knots2
32 Lastll' the shrp's measurements are as
follox's. length 131 5 m. bcam 16 
-5 m. drs-
placement. 5 860 tons The ship has a comple-
ment of 243
Sparn 's Ii- I 00 
.fn gate
33. Thc F-100 prograrnme had rts ongm m the
Alta Mar Plan u'hrch established the Spanrsh
Navy's frigate requrrement at 15 shrps. Thus
Spam rvas actrvelv involved in the NFR90 pro-
grarnme until the latter was cancelled in 1989
orving to the comphcatrons of carrytng out a
project of that kind u'ith such a large number of
countrles.
34 The F-100 prograrnmc started at that
juncture, It sought to take advantage of the ex-
T lfrfi,t, 7o, the Defence Inclttstrv - ,\,'ar:l'
http: //nurv naval technologl, com/pro3 ectslfl24l
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penence and know-how gained rvrth the NFR90
proJect, by contrnuing thc manrfold progress
achieved in the construction of Spain's second
FFG fngate series 
- 
the Santa Maria F-80 Class
(Navarra F-85 and Canarias F-86) 3 Thus, the
alm was to take full advantage of Spain's indus-
tnal potentral, and especrally rts mrlitary shrp-
yards whcre Spain had notched up a number of
notable successes.
35 In 1990 thc Spanish Navy and the milrtary
naval constructron yard, Bazan, began the pre-
feasibihty phase and drer,r,up the rnrtral operating
spccifications for construction of four frigates of
3500-4000 tons This first stud1, looked at var-
ious alternative solutions for the ship's platform,
combat s)'stem, propulsron system etc. and cnded
up raising displacement to 4 500 tons to conform
more closely to Naq'requircments
36. The studl'also revealed the need for exter-
nal cooperation. urth thc arm of cuttrng down on
technologl, risks and costs. Thus possrbrlrties for
European cooperatlon m specrfic areas hke the
combat sl,stem and equrpment procurement rvere
considered. Talks then began u'rth Germanv and
the Netherlands (Spain's earlier partners in the
NFR90) u'hrch u'ere going ahead u'rth therr plans
for neu' fngates and u'hich, rn the Spanrsh
authoritres' r,reu', offered opportunrties for flex-
rble and hence more realistic and feasrble coop-
eratron.
37 In November 1993, the Bazan, Roi,al
Schelde and Blohm und Voss naval vards srgned
an agreement to collaborate rn the devclopment
and constructron of the vanous ship's platforms,
shortll' aftenlards the defence mmisters of the
three countries concerned srgned the MOU on
coopcratlon ol'er the definrtron phase Moreover
at the same trme Spain's Indra group signed an
agreement rvrth the Dutch firm Signaal rn con-
nectron u'rth the APAR (Actrve Phased Array'
Radar)-based combat system being developed
jointlv bi,Germany, Canada and the Netherlands
38 The F-100's definrtron phase ended in July
1995 and, from Spain's point of ueq', trilateral
cooperation throughout that penod was regarded
as entircly, satisfactory, both at government and
rndustry level. Hou'ever, during that phase the
AAW (Anti-Air Warfare) segment u,as identrfied
as the most complex part of the programme and
-Rrrut,, 
Erpafiola de Defensa (RED), March 1997
thc Spanrsh Nary decidcd that to adopt the
APAR systcm, rvhtch, as noted prevrously, was
thcn rn the development phase, u,ould introduce
uncertarntrcs over both costs and schedules Un-
ccrLarnty over costs had no place rn the Spanrsh
tenderrng s)'stem under rvhrch programme costs
had to be knoun from the outset rvhile the pros-
pect of a slippage rn schedules militated against
Sparn's urgent need for nerv frrgates rvithin the
shortest possrble time-frame
39 In addrtron, Sparn regarded as unaccept-
able the nsks rnherent in modif,,ing the guidance
system for the SM-2 mrssrles chosen for the
F-100 frrgate to make it compatrble wrth APAR.
It would basrcally' have been necessary to run
s)'stem acceptance trials and thrs '*'ould have held
up the prograrnme.
40 These various consideratrons led the
Spanrsh authorrtres to pull out of jornt develop-
ment of the antr-air systcm rvith Germany and the
Netherlands rn June 1995 and turn thelr attcntron
to a solutron based on the US Aegis system
Thrs necessarrly entailed extending the pro-
gramme's defimtion phase for a further )'ear rn
order to adapt rt to the ncrr antr-air s\stem.
.ll. In March 1997 construction bcgan of the
four fngates, at a total cost of 280 billion Span-
rsh pesetas, approximately 100 billion of which
\\'ere earmarked for forergn procurement of
equrpmcnt for u,hich Spain does not have 100%
homc-groun devclopment capacrtv or rvhose
domestrc manufacture rn hmited series rvould not
be profitable
12 Net garns on 
.;ornt productron, trade-offs
and technologl' transfers for thrs trpe of foreign
procurement would be ovcr 9l7o
43 Forergn mdustrv rnvolvement u'rll marnly'
be concentrated on the combat s)'stem based, as
stated. on the Aegis sy'stcm, uith Lockheed Mar-
trn as the marn supplier. Thc Spanrsh industry
rvill marnlv be rnvolved rn the productron of the
shrp's platform and spccific equipment for the
combat s1'stem
44. The revrew' Naval Forcesa opines that
Sparn's choice of Aegis for rts tu'o F-100 frigates
represents a ne\\' phase in the svstem's evolutton
as an lnternational prograrnme, as the F-100's
combat system includes Spanish sensors and
-l'or',l 
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weapons, a Spy-lD radar and a Spanrsh combat
drrectron sy'stem. Thus Sparn is the first country
to produce malor Aegrs system components out-
srdc the United States.
45. In desrgnrng the cornbat s)'stem for the
F-100, Spain looked to that of the US Arlergh
Burke destroyer, adapting it to Spanish oper-
ational requirements. The aim of the process is
to producc a home-grown operational command
and control system, which, together rvith the
Aegis system, would make possrble total inte-
gration of all the sensor and weapons subsys-
tems, irrespective of whethcr they rvere produced
inside or outside of Sparn.
46 Thus the main feature of the F-100 Com-
bat Drrection System is that it ensures easy,
raprd interconnection betu,een drfferent tyres of
on-board equipment, provrdrng compatibrlity be-
tu'een those of Spanish and US manufacture
Spanish comparues involved rn the production of
thc combat svstem are Indra, Samsel, Fiibrica de
Artilleria de Baz6n (FABA) and Enosa
47 The combat system consrsts of four main
segments5: an anil-aircraft system, the basrc
component of u'hrch rs the Aegrs system. res-
ponsible for the search, detection, rdentrficatron
and monitorrng of targets, firing and guidance of
antr-arrcraft missiles and control of the rnterccp-
tor aircraft themselves. The core of the s1'stem rs
the AN/Spr'-lD three-dimensional long-range
radar and the MK-99 illuminators for mrssrle
gutdance. Weapons sl,stems rnclude the 48-cell
MK-41 vertical launcher for the SM-2MR and
ESSM short and medium-range mrssrles and a
Meroka 28 gun combined rvrth a RAN30L/K
detection radar svstem.
48 The F-100's anti-submanne rvarfare seg-
ment conslsts of DE-1160 LF ship's sensors,
helicopter-installed Lamps III SH-60B sensors
(for Srkorskl' SH-60 Seaharvk helicopters) and
MK-46-5 torpedoes capable of berng launched
from ship or hehcopter
49 The F-100 is also equrpped rvith a Har-
poon surface-to-surface missile system and an
MK-45 gun associated with a DORNA fire con-
trol sy'stem. Thrs artrllery assemblv is designed
to providc the vessels rvith better fire-porver
against coastal defences.
Tnr*to ttpafiola cle Defensa (RED), No ll9-120,
I 998
50 Frnall1,, the fourth componcnt of the fng-
ate's combat system rs rts electronic lvarfare
capability The F-100 u,rll have Elnath MK-
9000 communrcatrons and an Aldebarin radar
set and MK-36-2 chafflaunchers
51. Thc vessel rn rts final vcrsion is qurte dif-
ferent to that envrsaged at the outset. It rs norv
133.2m in length. wrth a beam of 17.5 m and
drsplacement of 5 760 tons. It is fitted with a
CODOG propulsron s)stem givrng rt a maximum
speed of lust over 28.5 knots It u,ill have a
complemcnt of 250. The F-100s are due to enter
into service betu'een 2002 and2007
The Dutch LFC Fngate
52 In the 1980s the Netherlands Navy also
jorned the NATO Frigate Replacement for the
90s QIIFR90) programme to desrgn neu'arr def-
cncc and command frigates, rvith the rntention of
using the nerv desrgn to replace the tu'o exrstmg
gurded-weapon fngates. Tromp and De Ruyter.
These ships act as AAW-platforms and com-
mand ships for naval task forccs. The shrps rvere
designcd in the 1960s and commrssroned in the
1970s Thev are equrpped for arr defence rvith
S ignaal-manufactured 3 D long-range air-survei l-
lance radar and US-produced Tartar and NATO
Sea Sparrou'mrssrles.
53 The Netherlands also lorned the NATO
Anti-Air Warfarc Sy'stem (NAAWS) prograrnme
for the development of a local area missile sys-
tem for the NFR90 The programme rvas to in-
corporatc dcvelopment of a multi-functron radar,
an agile short-range mrssrle and an AAW core
system
54 The NFR90 and NAAWS programmes
collapsed at roughll, the same trme the Berlin
r,r'all fell and the Netherlands Nav1, rvas left with
a requirement for neu,air-defence frigates and no
prograrnmc urth u'hrch to fulfil it. A nerv pro-
gramme n'as therefore mrtrated in cooperation
rvith Germanl, When Spain subsequently joined,
it became knoun as Tnlateral Frigate Cooper-
atton (or TFC)
55 A decisron u'as taken at the outset of the
prograrnme that its alm was not Jornt construc-
tion of ships but the pursuit of cost-effeclveness
rn terms both of procurement and life-cycle costs
Each nation consequently retains the freedom to
choose rts oun preferred solutions. However,
rvhcre cooperatron rs possrble and feasrble rt rs of
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course pursued. Hence Sparn can contrnue to bc
part of the TFC-programme desprte havrng opted
out of theloint AAW-development
56 In the Netherlands the neu' frrgates are
knorm as Luchtverdedlglngs- en Commando-
Fregatten or LCFs, rvhrch stands for arr-defence
and command frrgates The Nctherlands is to
burld four such ships.
57. Germanv and the Netherlands decrded to
cooperate on developing the AAW s1'stem in
conjunction u'ith the TFC programme A devel-
opment contract for this integrated systcm u'as
signed in June 1997 u,ith the Netherlands as the
contracting authonty and Signaal as prime con-
tractor.
58 The pnncrpal components of the lornt
AAW s)'stem are
- 
the APAR multi-function radar,
- 
a long-range rnfrared search and track-
ing sy'stem, known as Sirius.
- 
the Smart-L long-range air surverllance
radar;
- 
the AAW softu'are;
- 
the MK-41 vertrcal launch s1'stem used
to fire both short-range Evolved Sea
Sparrou' mrssiles and medrum-rangc
standard mrssrles;
- 
ts'o MK-31 gurded mrssrle s1'stems for
Rolhng Arrframe Missiles (rn the Ger-
man sy,stem onlr'),
tu'o Goalkeeper systems (rn the Dutch
s1'stem onll').
59 The development of the actrve phased
array'radar (APAR) rs a multrnatronal effort rr'rth
the Dutch Government agam as contractmg
authority'and Signaal as prime contractor Work-
share subcontractors have been selected rn the
partrcipating countries, Canada and Germany', on
the basrs ofcostshares
60. APAR development began rn the latter half
of the 1980s Followrng the demise of the
NAAWS prograrnme, a technology demonstrator
for an X-band actrve phased array radar rvas
built in the Netherlands. The prograrrune, knoun
as EXPAR, demonstrated the feasibrlrty of the
concept. APAR project definition started in mid-
1993 and ended in late 1995 and the pro.;ect has
nou' entcred rts engrncerrng and manufacturrng
development phase, due to contrnue untrl early'
l 999
6l APAR u'rll be able to pcrform a number of
functrons srmultancouslv These compnse hori-
zon search, a hmrted volume search, accurate
trackrng ofover 100 arr targets and provrsion of
support to defendrng missrles through mrd-course
guidancc and termrnal illumrnation The s-"-stem
is pnmartly designed to dcfeat verl' log-fl1,ing
stcalthl, antr-shrp mrssrles and ven, hrgh-fly'ing
supcrsonlc drvers Apart from rts air-defence
functrons, APAR rvrll also have a role m surface
warfare, carrymg out surface search functions
and providrng fire control for the gun svstem.
62 APAR x'rll bc capable of use rn both blue
rvater and broxn $'ater operatrons Hence rt rvrll
be a pulse Doppler s1'stcm ulth a large band-
urdth and hrgh rcsolutron In terms of missile
support, rt u'rll be capable of sendrng modulated
uphnk mcssages and prol'idrng rnterrupted tcrm-
mal rllumrnatron. The sl,stem rs capable of
handhng a number of cngagements per face rn the
same tlme frame,
63 The Netherlands. rn coryunctron ruth
Germanr'. ts lnvestrgatrng how APAR should be
used to control dcfendrng \\,eapons agarnst bal-
Itsttc mrssrles The rcsearch u'as carrred out b-v-
the Apphed Physrcs Laboratory of the Johns
Hopkrns Unnersrtl' xrth support from the US
Navy and Amencan mrssrle contractors The
antenna conslsts of four statrc faccs provrdrng
360n coverage Each plate consists of roughll'
3 000 transmrVrecerve modules.
64 Sea Sparrou' and SM-2 are semr-actn'e
homrng devrces Houever as actlve phased arrav
radar rs not capablc of provrdrng continuous
wave rllumlnatron, a number of development
prograrnmes have becn started ri'rth US Nary
support. These should result in an X-band
uphnk system for the Evolved Sea Sparrou,
Mrssrle and a specral form of terminal rllumm-
atron (interrupted contrnuous wave rllumrnatron)
for both ESSM and SM-2. Thc SM already'has
an X-band uphnk provision. Stmulattons,
including 6-degrees-of-freedom simulations, have
shoun the feasibrlitl' of the concept and devcl-
opment rs undcr rva\'. The Hughes Company' rn
San Drego rs dcveloprng firc control softrvare
alongsrde thrs actrvrty'
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65 Smart-L u,as developcd by Srgnaal under a
Dutch government contract The desrgn is based
on the S-band Smart system ln use on board the
Dutch M and L and the German F-I23-class
frrgates. Under the terms of the development
contract, Signaal rvrll dcliver a pre-productron
model. Facton' acceptance of the PPM took
place last 1'ear r,rrth satisfactory results Smart-L
u'rll be uscd as a volume search radar and to
carry out fightcr control on board air-defence and
command frigates
66 Smart-L is an L-band long-range pulse
Doppler surverllance radar. Like APAR, its dc-
srgn rs optimised for defence agamst lou,-fly,ing,
lou'-observable threats and very high-flr'ing tar-
gets m a coastal envlronment The sl,stcm can
detect very small targets and, oiving to that
capabrlitl, Smart-L could detect birds as real
targets, w'hrch rs a problem in a littoral envrron-
ment. Therefore the s),stem is equipped u'rth a
filter based on the Doppler spectrum to ehminate
brrd contacts
61 The antenna consists of 24 honzontal hn-
ear arravs, each consrstrng of 48 drpoles Of
those 24, onlv the top 16 are used for transmrs-
sron On receptron. the 24 arrays are used to
create 14 stacked beams to provide altitude in-
formatron. Under normal operation the sl,stcm
emlts a fan beam, rvhrle under Jammlng con-
drtrons lt can emrt a narro\\' hrgh-por,l'er burn-
through beam. It therefore also has a part to plav
rn balhstrc missrle defence. as thrs tlpc of beam
can bc emrtted up to even hrgher eler,'atlons
68 The Netherlands cooperates rvith Canada
rn the development of Srrius Canada acquired
substantial expenence through the lornt do,elop-
ment ri'ith the United States of a system knoun
as AN/SAR-8 and the Netherlands has learned a
good deal from the development of the IRSCAN-
s)'stem. The Sinus system has trvo optical heads
69 As part of the AAW system Sinus rvrll
perform several tasks. rt rvrll supplement APAR
under adverse radar condrtrons, rt u,ill provrde
continuous horizon coverage and, by, providing
accurate angle measurements, will be a maJor
asset m the fusion of sensor data on lorv-flyng
targets; and under conditrons of radar srlence, rt
rvill obvrously provide passive surverllance
70 At the present trme a pre-production model
rs under contract Delivcry is envrsaged for the
second half of next )'ear r,vhcn a programme of
both riarm and cold-wcather land and sea-trials
rvill begin.
I1 According to a Netherlands Defence Mrn-
istry statement. total procuroment costs for the
four Dutch Nary LCF frrgates ivill be I 6l brl-
hon dollars6 Contracts for thc vessels, which are
to be built b1,Ro1'al Schelde, rvere srgncd in June
1995 and February 1997.
72 The Royal Nctherlands Naw,(RNLN) rvill
procure and rntegrate the vanous componcnts
rvhich are to form the LFC's sensor, wcapons
and command system The RNLN Centre for the
Automation of Weapon and Command S1'stems
wrll develop thc requrred softu'are and Ro1,al
Schelde rvrll rnstall the sensor, rveapons and
command system on board
13 McDonnell-Douglas Harpoon antr-shrp
mrssrles are alreadv on order through Foreign
Mrlrtarl, Sales, rvhrle refurbishcd ex-Canadian
Na4' 127 rrrm maln guns are being ordered from
Otobreda Other ma.1or \\'eapons st,stems such as
the SM-2 Block IIIA and ESSM are being pro-
curcd separatelv.
74 Thc LCF rvill mcasure 130 2 m rn length
and 16 9 metres rn brcadth, rvrth a drsplacement
of 5 840 tons, and rt u'rll have a CODOG propul-
sron s)'stem
III. Cooperation befiyeen France, Italy
and the United Kingdom
The Horizon progromme
75 France. Italv and thc Unrted Kingdom
rvere also rnr,'olved rn thc NFR90 prograrnme
desrgned to mcet the rcqurrement of man1, u'est-
ern navres for a fngatc u'rth effectivc anti-aircraft
capabrlrty The pro;ect collapscd. as stated pre-
vrouslv, basrcally bccause the l,ariatron in the
requirements of the partlctpant countries com-
promised thc viabilitv of thc projcct, partrcularly,
rn financial tcrms.
16 Neverthelcss the cxrstence of ccrtain ob-
jective needs. the pressure of cut-backs in def-
ence budgets both on account of the cconomic
chmate and orvrng to the demrse of the Soviet
bloc, led inrtially,to France and thc United King-
dom..;orned shorth, after by Italy, to consider the
irrrt n"pnce ll'eeklv.23 July 1997
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rdea of cooperatlng rn the procurement of a single
class of frrgatcs desrgned for anti-arr u,arfare
Thus the Honzon programme came rnto berng
'77. Horizon rs an ambitrous programme Ac-
cordrng to Commander Mrchel PerchocT thrs rs
true from several differcnt angles, and partrcu-
larly from an operatronal point of vrer"', as rt
alms to provrdc three navies, each rvith different
naval assets, rvrth a smgle air-defence vessel.
startlng from the present srtuatron u'here Euro-
pean navles have up to norv been exclusivelv de-
pendent for medrum-range anti-arr rvarfare sys-
tems on equipment supplied b1'the Unrted States
78. From a technrcal pornt of vrew, the fore-
seeable grouth in the threat of rncreasingll, hrgh-
performance antr-ship \\,eapons, urll nccessanlv
mcan that defence svstems skrp a generation, thc
more so, as the choice of a main \\'eapons svstem
based on the Aster mrssile means that there must
bc coordrnatron betrveen the Horizon programme
and the Franco-Itahan FSAF programmet
79 It is also an ambrtrous programme as far
as cooperatlon is concemed smce there rs a loint
organlsatron in London for the Horrzon pro-
gramme and rn Pans for the PAAMS (Princrpal
Antr-Arr Missrle Sy'stem). brrngrng together rep-
resentatrves from mihtarv staffs and procurement
sen'ices. as u'ell as an mdustnal structure to de-
v'elop thc mam programme svstcms
80 Frnallr', lt presents a maJor challenge from
a financral pornt of vieu' since the arm is to
commlssron some 20 shrps of this partrcular
fngate class, an cvcnt that constrtutes a Europcan
mrlestone The programmc cntarls a financral
commrtment of the hrghcst order. shared on an
equrtable basrs betu'een the arms manufacturers
of the three natrons. and one that has to be com-
patible u'ith the spending power of those coun-
tries, uhrch are at present sub;ect to severe
budgetarl' restrarnt.
8l Commander Perchoc considers that al-
though pomts of vreu' can often drffer cven bc-
trvcen onlv thrcc partrcipants, a firm resolve ex-
rsts to meet loint needs, regardless of indrvidual
rnterests Thrs demands a strong management
structure. as far as both government and industrl'
' Coh Btru, No 2370, 2 November 1996.
8 Assembll, Document 1588 
- 
Transatlanfic coop-
eratron tn European antt-rrttsstle defence Part II,
Rapporteur Mr Atkrnson.
are conccrned, whrch ma)'mean longer schedulcs
than are desrrable but sccms nevertheless to be an
essentral prcrcqursrtc for the success of the pro-
gramme
82 Jornt opcrational necds have been analyscd
in thc hght of three possible scenarios for frigate
deploy.rnent:
(a) as escort to an arr and sea task force
based around an arrcraft carrier. The
frigate's tasks u'ould consist of area de-
fence and guarantcslng command and anti-
arr rvarfare functions.
(b) u'ithin an unarmed or merchant vessel
formation In this instance the frrgate
u'ould be capable of excrcrsing tactrcal
command of a naval force (OTC 
- 
Officcr
rn tactical command functron) and must
provrde full protectron to nerghbouring
vessels (local defcncc)
@ saihng solo rn an operatlonal setting,
as m the follou'rng trpe of mrssrons
- 
a deterrent prcscncc off friendll'
coasts m lou'-level crises.
- 
patrolling areas of moderate nsk,
operatlons u'here marrne block-
ades arc rnvoived,
- 
trackrng or markmg susprcrous or
hostrle craft.
svacuatlorl of natronals and
friendlv crtrzens from countrrcs
rvhcre there are drsturbances.
83 The starting pornt for such cooperatron
\\'as, as rndrcated rn the documcnt the Rap-
porteurs sere sent b1' thc Honzon Programme
Office, agreement on a corrrmon mrlitan' re-
quirement on the part of the Naw Chrcfs-of-Staff
of thc three countnes rnvolved Accordrng to the
same document, the Chrcfs-of-Staff *'ere con-
tinurng ''to pay rcgular attentron to this pro-
grarnme, rn ordcr to cnsure. tnter alta. that the
expresslon of the mrlrtarl, rcqurrement continues
to reflect a gcnume cornmon rntercst"
84. Thus the three Defence Ministers signed
an MOU rn London on I I Julv 1994 setting out
the main princrplcs govemrng the programme
Thrs u'as supplemented bi a preliminary docu-
ment srgned at the samc tlme as the MOU and
10
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then by a first supplement, also signed by, the
three mrnisters in March 1996 dcaling ',r,ith
funding for the first of the trvo phases 
- 
the
Definitron Phase (l) and the Burlt Phasc (2) 
-
tnto rvhrch thc programme rs broadly divided
Supplement l's content specifies the nature of
the rvork to be undertaken, the procurement
stratcgl,to bs follorved and the cost and schedule
to be met.
85 A second supplement setting out the basrs
for phase 2 is berng prepared and could be
completed in Iate 1998 for srgnature in earlv
1999
86. Accordrng to the Horizon programme
management, the philosophy,formrng the basis of
the programme rs stronglv mfluenced b1' the les-
sons learned from the NFR90 programme, es-
pecialh' u'rth regard to defining the framervork
for cooperation to meet the primc ob.;ectrve of
making substantial savings. That phrlosophy
rests on seven maln pnncrples laid doun by' the
mrlitarl' staff and procurement authontres of the
countries involved, unfarhngly supported "by a
strong polrtrcal rvill"
87 Reference has alreadl, been made to the
first of those pnncrples. the exrstence of a com-
mon mrlrtary requrremcnt, as thc starting point
for cooperatron The second refers to the ivill-
lngness of the particrpants to commlt themselves
rn the long tcrm Again accordmg to the Honzon
programme document, the pro.lect has been built
up on the basis of an overall perspectrve of thc
problem encompassrng not only all of the phases
concerned rn the desrgn and burldrng of the shrp
but also the operatronal and m-serv'ice phascs 
-
makrng rt necessan' for partrcrpatrng natrons to
have a long-term commltment so that solulons
can be developed that offer financral benefits
throughout the life of the ship and provrdrng the
rndustry ruth the vrsibility it needs to encourage
it to restructure
88 The thrrd is the srgnrng of a singlc coop-
eration agreement for developmcnt, and con-
structron of in-servrce support for a single class
of frigate Thrs does not rnclude PAAMS pro-
curement u'hich is covered by a scparate coop-
eratlon prograrnme betu'een the three countrrcs.
89 In addition to the aspects mentroned in
paragraph 84. this agreement specifies the
management structure for the progranune, cost
and u'ork-shanng rules, rules on selection of
equipmcnt, regulatrons on safety and the protec-
tron of rnformatron and on the legal arrangements
governrng the rights and obhgatrons of each of
the partrcipants
90 The fourth principle deals rvrth the constr-
tution of integrated management teams urth real
delegatron of authorrty. On the government side,
supervision of the programme (except for
PAAMS) has been entrusted to a Steenng
Commrttee made up of representatives of the
procurement services of thc three countries.
Nomrnated by the mrlitary staff, the operational
authoritics for therr part form a Naval Committee
and are represented on the Steering Committee.
9l Responsibilitl' for the conduct of thc pro-
gramme hes u,ith the JPO (Jornt Project Office)
reportrng only, to the Stecring Commrttee,
Workrng alongsrde the JPO rs the ORST
(Operatronal Requirement Staff Tcam) made up
of officcrs from the three mrlitary staff These
tu'o kev agencies arc in constant touch
92 The organrsatronal structure of the JPO is
such that authonty, and responsrbrlrty rn each
field rests x'rth one rndrvidual, thus avordrng the
grid-locks rn the dccisron-makrng process that
can occur m programmes rvhcre posts overlap,
93 In terms of industrial organisatron. an in-
tcrnatronal consortrum. thc IJVC or International
Jornt Venture Companl', u'as formed rn Februarl'
1995 from the French Drrection des Construc-
trons Navales 
- 
Internatronal (DCNI). the Itahan
Onzzonte SpA (a 50/50 venture betu'ecn Fin-
cantrerr and Frnmeccanrca) and GEC-Marrne of
the UK. dcsrgnated as the rndustrral pnme con-
tractor for the prolect
94 It u'as felt nccessary to entrust the overall
contractlng authorrty' for the pro.;cct to a smgle
compan\' (IJVC) u'hrch u'ould have sole res-
ponsrbrlrtv for suppl-'-rng thc shrps rn accordance
wrth thc requrred specificatrons and u'rthrn the
agreed schedule and costs The contract covers
the follo*rng rtems:
- 
desrgn definrtron and dctarled desrgn of
the shrp.
construction of the propclled hull.
supply' and intcgratron of the combat
svstcm.
- 
dehvcn, of combat-read1' shrps meeting
the requrred operatronal and technical
performance specrfi cations
II
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95 There are thrce marn types of cqurpment
those ttems, ferv in number, u'hrch are govcrn-
ment-supphed. the most notable of whrch rs
PAAMS. of rvhich more urll be sard in due
course
96 Then there are the s),stems to be deveioped
such as the combat managcment s)'stem (CMS).
the fullv integrated transmissron s),stem (FICS)
and the electronic u'arfarc system (EWS) for
u'hrch rndustn' rn thc three countnes has been
asked to group together initially' to compcte for
the desrgn definrtron phase, culminatrng in the
selcction of the consortium to be responsrble for
carr)'lng out development and productron dunng
thc second phase The three countrres mtend to
transfcr the contractual responsrbrlitv for devel-
opment and production of these three s1'stems to
the IJVC. u'hich u'rll act as the primc contractor
for the entire shrp, from the start of thc second
phase 
- 
pror,ided the IJVC convinces the JPO
that rt offers the best value for moncv and an
adequ ate performance guarantec
97 Industnal consortla compnsmg firms from
all threc countnes havc come together for the
definition phases for each of the three svstems.
For the CMS thc t\\'o consortia prescnt consisl on
the one hand of Bae SEMA, Thomson-CSF and
AESN and HCF S1'stem France, Datamat. and
Ferrantr Naval svstems on the other For the
FICS there are consortra consistmg of Elmer
(MAC). Thomson-CSF. Redrfon and GEC Mar-
coni on the one hand. and Italtel. Srcmens-
Plcsso'. Racal Radro. Bull and Dassault Elec-
tronlque on thc other Lastlr', the tu'o consortia
rnvolr,ed rn thc EWS consist of Thomson-CsF.
Dassault Electronrquc. Marconr and Elettroruca
on thc onc hand and Racal. Alenra and CS Def-
encc on the other
98 Thrs process has faccd a fair number of
drfficultres of all trpes Tl:rus Defense Newse
reports that the delav rn au'ardmg the contracts
for developmcnt of the EWS is due to the fact
that "accordrng to a senlor Britrsh rndustry
offrcial there has been no government cash for
Horrzon EW for three years", placrng the
rndustrres of the thrcc countnes tn lncrcaslng
difficulty' Up to nou' each of the srx firms
formrng part of the t$'o consortia have spent half
a mrlhon pounds of their o\\n mone)/ supportrng
teams of hrghh, trained staff. Brrtrsh managers
have reportedly put forward the suggestron of
entenng a smglc Jornt bld as a \\'av of avoidrng
evcn greater losses rf the problem cannot be
settled rmmedrately
99. Lastly,, a thrrd categon, of cquipment is
that not requiring development financed from the
Honzon prograrnme Thrs rs to be procured by,
competrtrve tender for equipment that exists on
the market.
100 The fifth pnncrple on ri'hich the pro-
gramme phrlosophv rs based is that of svstematrc
recourse to competltron and maximum use of
existing solutions and facilitres Thc sixth can be
described srmply' as stnct cost control and pro-
vrdes that no dctarled pre-determined sharrng of
u'ork ts to be organised bctu'een thc industrres of
the particrpatrng countries, an attempt u'rll be
made onlv to achrel'e a broad overall balance of
thc industrral loadrng of the three countrres
throughout the programmc
101 The last pnncrple states that there are to
be no national varlants, other than those
expressed rn the operatronal requrrement as nec-
essary for easv rntegratron rnto thc respective
countnes' fleets Measures have bcen taken to
avord the introductron of nerl' varrants rvhrch
rvould rncrease costs exponentrally'for anv coun-
try that drd so and reduce volume effccts for the
others
102. It has been agreed bt,the three countnes.
urth regard to the fngate's antr-alrcraft s1'stem,
\\'eapons and scnsors. that the elements makrng
up tts Prrncrpal Antr-Arr Mrssilc Sy stcm
(PAAMS). rn partrcular Acrospatrale's Aster I5
and 30 mrssrles. urll bc corrrmon to all of them
France and Italv arc to use Alenra's multr-func-
tlon rotaton, radar EMPAR and the Unrted
Krngdom Sremens-Plessc\/'s Sampson nor-tech-
nology' radar u'rth miniaturrscd rntcgrated
transmit/recerve modules,
103 The French and Italian fngatcs wrll also
carn'missile launchers developcd b1' both coun-
tries. rvhrle the Unrted Kingdom has opted for thc
MK-41 verlcal launcher All frigates are to
carry tradrtional long-range Smart-L radar
104 The Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) for thc launch of thc PAAMS pro-
gralnme, u,hrch, as mentroned pre'i,'rousir', has tts
headquarters rn Parrs, u'as signed by' the three
countnes rn March 1996. Shorth' aftcnvards a
l2
' De1"ns" l'eu's, ll Ma1' 1997
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Jolnt-vcnture company, EuToPAAMS, was form-
ed betrveen Eurosam, u'rth a two-thrrds cqurtv
share, and UKAMS r,r'rth one thrrd, comprisrng
srx partners: Aerospatrale, Alenra, Thomson-CSF
Arrsy's, Brrtrsh Aerospace, GEC Marconi and
Sremens-Plessel''0. Installatron of the svstem and
rntegration on board the frigatcs is schcduled to
begin in 2004.
105. The EuToPAAMS consortrum is respon-
sible for industnal productron of the anti-arr
defence s)'stem for the frigates. The svstem var-
tants referred to earher for the French and Itahan
Navies u,ill be built b1, Eurosam and those for
the Ro1,al Naq,by UKAMS.
106 PAAMS combrnes the Bntish requrrement
for local area defence u,rth the requrrements
identified by France (self-defence s1'stem) and
Italv (medium-range area defence sy'stem). In
an1. event the British decrsion to adopt the Samp-
son multi-functlon radar solution has affected thc
entire prograrnme as France and Italy opted for
Thomson's ARABEL radar (on u,hrch the fire-
control svstem is based) and EMPAR (fire con-
trol) rvhich are alreadv undergomg cxtensrve
shrpboard tests and are expected to enter produc-
tron soon Sampson ls at present lrttlc more than
a technology demonstratorr i.
107 Lastll', the chorce of a drfferent multr-
function radar necessarrlv rmphcs a rvhole senes
of changes to the combat management sl'stem
(CMS) and the electronrc u'arfare sl,stem (EWS)
to mentron onl1'thc most sahent. In all likchhood.
these drfficulties he behind the decrsron of the
PAAMS programme managcment team not to
provrde mformatron about the development of the
prograrnmc drrect to the Rapporteurs
108. Horizon frrgates urll have a drsplacement
of 6 500 tons, an ovcrall length of 148 4 m, a
beam of 19.9 m. a maxlmum speed of 29 knots
and a range at a speed of 18 knots of 7 000 nau-
trcal mrles The shrp u'ill accommodate 235
crew
109. Inrtial forecasts suggest that the United
Kingdom rvill buy' 12 fngates, Italv 6 and France
4, although such figures, especrally those for the
United Krngdom and Italy are qurte unrealistrc
6 Rnr* Arrospatrale 1-1./, December 1996-January
t997.
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and a more reasonable estrmate u,ould bc 6 or 8
for thc Ro1'al Naw' and 2 for Itall, and France.
although thc latter two countncs could possiblv
buv one or t*'o morc at a later date.
IV. Conclusions
110 Throughout thc present report. u,c have
examined tu,o cooperatton prograrnmes, the un-
derlydng thrnking, u'orkrng methods and final
arms of which drffcr quite u'idclv For this rea-
son, it is drfficult to drau' conclusions that hold
good for tu,o such drffercnt types of project, nei-
ther of u,hich arc the product of rvhim or hazard.
but the outcome of a long and carefully,-consid-
ered process. It u'ould therefore pcrhaps be most
appropriate to formulate a number of general
consrderatrons that could applv to either of thcm
and also drau'attentron to the partrcular featurcs
of each that might sen'e as examples rn fi.rture
collaborativc vcnturcs
I I l. First, to state thc obvious. schedules must
be rdentical 
- 
an essentlal condrtion for definrtion
of a desrgn of a greater or lesser degrce of com-
monalrtv.
ll2 One conclusron that mrght be drarvn from
trilateral cooperatron rs that results are achrev-
able ri'ithin stringent scheduling requrrements and
that common der,,elopments can be agreed on in
line ri'ith the funds made available br cach par-
trcipant There rs no need. accordrng to the threc
countries takrng part rn the TFC programme. to
build rdcntrcal shrps Extcnsrve rnformation ex-
change on desrgn preparatlon u'ith each countn'
adoptrng its oun optrmum desrgn solutrons, has
proved a better approach for the trilateral part-
ners The results achrcved have shoun that thcre
rs no necd for a heavrly'-staffed rnternational de-
stgn office. Natronal organrsations contrnue to
work as normal- x'rth some extra posts bcmg
created for specrahst staff. u,ho also act as har-
son offrcers, n'orkrng from small;oint offices..
ll3 As far as subsvstems requirmg develop-
ment are concerned. thesc need to be located rn a
multinational framovork from the first phase and
cooperation ln areas covercd bv a grven rndus-
trral policy' must be based on medium- and long-
term cnteria.
ll4. It also seems desrrablc to try and strmulatc
a culture of cooperation u'rthm firms. preferabll,
through involvement ln prograrnmes rvhich are
relatrvell' strarghtfonvard or rvhere success is
l3
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guaranteed b1'the status of thc countn, actrng as
the drrvmg forcc, as rs the case u'ith the Unrted
Statcs and the ESSM (Evolved Sea Sparrou'
Mrssilc).
ll5 A problem corrrmon to both cooperatron
programmes is the drfferences between the var-
rous natronal procurement systems whrch are
based on different regulatrons and working meth-
ods. In the case of the Honzon Programme,
transfcr of responsibrlrtrcs from the national
sphere to the JPO proved difficult and the pro-
grarnme management rtself drew attention to the
danger of thc JPO appearing to be a "fourth
natron" wrth rts oun agenda to pursue. The JPO
must remaln, and be understood as, the organi-
satron actmg for and on behalf of the natrons and
formrng an rntegral part of therr oun organi-
satrons
116 It should also be noted that Honzon is un-
doubtedll, one of the most rmportant cooperation
programmes ever tackled in Europe. not srmply'
ln terms of rts size, but also bccausc it represents
cooperatron rn thc urder scnse of the rvord, rn-
volvrng an unremlttrng search for consensus on
ma.;or decrsrons 
- 
a factor that has at timcs ham-
pered the prograrnme s advancc and on several
occasrons been the cause ofdcla)'s m schedules
111 Furthermore the JPO's lack of legal per-
sonalitl' has deprrved rt of a number of means
that u'ould have facrlrtatcd both rts creatron and
rts mode of operatron. as Document l4l9 submit-
ted to our o\\r Assembll' has alreadv pornted
out12
I 18 Lastlr,, the Honzon Programme manage-
ment consrders lt prcmature to drarv definrtrve
conclusrons frorn rts experience, even though rt
regards rt as extremely' useful It could un-
doubtedil' prove useful rn definrng principles for
the future management of programmes
I 19 The countnes mvolved rn TFC pornt to the
prograrnme's flexrbilrtl' as one of its salient fea-
tures and one of its advantages. as opposed to
u'hat rs regarded as the overlv rigrd structure of
the Horrzon prograrrrne
120. The Rapporteurs rvould also like to touch,
albeit summarilr,, upon another aspect of naval
D,qtr.tnUfl'Document 1419 on The European
armaments agency 
- 
reply to the i9th annual report
of the Councli, Rapporteur Mr Borderas.
cooperatron whrch they'had occasion to encoun-
ter rn the coursc of preparing thrs rcport The
Brrmingham Declaratron of the WEU Council of
Mrnrsters, dated 7 Mai' 1996. stated. m thc scc-
tion dealing wrth our o*n Organisatlon's oper-
atronal development, that "Mrnisters uelcomed
thc decrsion of the UK Government to make rts
Opcratronal Sea-Trarrung facrlities available to
WEU for national or collcctrve use by WEU
nations".
l2l The Declaratron noted that shared use of
these types of facrlrtres could improve military
cooperation among WEU nations and rnvited
other WEU natrons to make stmilar offers, takrng
mto account u,ork in progress on multinatronal
task-sharing
122 The Rapporteurs vrsrtcd the Flag Officer
Sea-Trainrng (FOST) at Devonport s'ho rs
ansn'erable to the Commander-in-Chref of the
Flcet for trainrng the surfacc ships of the Roy'al
Navl' and Roval Fleet Auxrhary and their em-
barked air assets to mect prescnbed operating
and performance standards As rvell as gomg to
sea for a trarrung cxercisc and observtng the ex-
tremely' efficient u'ay cvolutions \\'ere carned out
under the command of Rear Admrral R J. Lrp-
prett, the Rapporteurs also had the opportunrty' of
pa]'mg a visrt to a land-based facrlrtl' provrdmg
trarning for dealing n'ith natural drsasters, lvrth
facrlrtres apparentll' unique tn Europe.
123 The possrbilrtv of naval cooperatron ovcr
trarning. especralll u'hen vanous svstems and
rndeed even hulls have been sublcct to common
procurement, is one to u,hlch serious thought
should be given b1, WEU and by rts member
countnes An mitratrvc in this drrection should be
taken by' the Organisatron to dcvelop rts opcr-
atronal role by' taking advantage of exrstmg
facrlrtres, particularll' uhen thel' have been al-
readv declared as avarlable for WEU's use. This
sublect may rvell be further developed rn a sub-
sequent report for the Assembl,v
124. In conclusion, and given the current Greek
Presrdencv of WEU, 1'our Rapporteurs also rvish
to drarv the attention of mcmbcrs of the Assem-
bl1'to recent developmcnts in the Hellenrc Navy
Burlding on successful cooperatron in recent
years rvith the Netherlands, the Greek Mimstry of
Defence has now developcd a ver), trmely 
.;oint
programme uith Germanl' for the provision of
14
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four MEKO 4-200 fngates tuo burlt and al-
readv commrssioned, tlvo currentll' bcrng burlt in
Grcek yards In parallcl a modernrsation pro-
gramme for the Hellenrc Navy's German-burlt
T-209 submanncs rs also ln progress
125 Together rvith a scrrcs of other new burlds
(5 LSTs. 2 further SSKs and 4 patrol boats)
these recent acquisrtrons are grving Grecce a
u'ell-balanced navl,which could servc as a uscful
model for others The fact that Grccce has been
able to burld on its long-standrng partrcipailon in
NATO's Standing Naval Force Medrterranean
(STANAVFORMED) by takrng part in exerclses
organised by the Euromarfor countries (France,
Italy, Portugal and Sparn) all bodes u,ell for the
futurc Indecd the expansron of Euromarfor to
othcr wrlhng partrcipants such as Grccce u'ould
be a vcry positive dcvelopmcnt cspecralll as that
organrsatron's ratson d'Atre runs parallcl to
WEU's commitmcnt to the so-called Petcrsberg
tasks
126 Your Rapporteurs make no apology for
endrng thc present rather technrcal report on a
more polrtrcal note: qurte the contran'. rn fact,
because the more political coopcration rve havc
betrveen our member states in Europe. the greatcr
need there rvrll be for multinatronal practrcal co-
operation also at sea, onshore and rn the air And
the more nccessary rt urll become to cooperatc in
both technrcal and industrral terms rn order to
equlp our forces ll'rth the most cost-cffective,
interopcrable matencl avarlablc
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